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INSURANCE-MEANING OF 'WAR" IN INSURANCE PoLicms-In
June 1950, United States military forces in Korea embarked upon an
engagement that has been variously described as "war," "police action,"
"hostilities," and "defense against aggression." No declaration of
war was made by Congress nor was a state of war proclaimed by the
Chief Executive or our Communist adversaries. This unprecedented
commitment of military forces in response to the recommendation
of an international organization was consummated by unilateral Presidential action,1 with Congress only impliedly ratifying the step taken
by enacting laws appropriating additional funds for the support of
the armed forces in Korea. 2 The ill-defined character of the conflict
in Korea has raised many problems, not the least of which regards
the meaning of the term "war" in contractual undertakings by insurers
where it is used to limit or control the risk assumed. The hazards
of war have been regarded as uninsurable under policies of personal
accident insurance and insurers have not charged premiums for this
risk. 3 The purpose of this comment is to examine the judicial interpretations of the term "war" in insurance contracts and their implications for those who select policy language.
A typical clause excluding or reducing the liability of insurers is
applicable where death occurs as a result of war. 4 These "war or
act of war, or while in military service in time of war'' exclusions first
appeared in policies of accident insurance during the first World War

See H. Rep. No. 127, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 1 (1951).
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, 64 Stat, L. 1044 (1950).
3 Rogers, "Modern Warfare and Its Effect on Policy Construction," 1952 lNs. L.J. 360.
4 2 RlcHAnns, lNsuRANcE, 5th ed., §254 (1952). See 137 A.L.R. 1263 (1942).
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and were considered adequate until Pearl Harbor, when new ways of
conducting war introduced problems in construing the war exclusion
clause.IS

I. The Background of Judicial Interpretation
The decisions which analyze the word "war" as a contractual term
in insurance policies are few in number and are almost evenly divided in the conclusions reached. They may best be considered in
chronological order.

A. World War I and II Prior to Formal Entry by the United
States. The provisions as framed first met judicial scrutiny in cases
where the insured lost his life in ships sunk by German submarines
prior to the existence of a state of war between the United States and
Germany. Recovery was denied on the basis of the exclusion; "war"
was held to be every contention by force between two nations under
the authority of their respective governments.6 These opinions reasoned that the existence of "war" was not dependent upon its formal
declaration, but included wars in which the United States was not
a formal participant.

B. Pearl Harbor Before Declaration of War. The puzzling
question whether death which resulted from undeclared war was
within the exclusion was more dramatically presented to the courts
in actions for proceeds of policies where the insured met his death in
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941 while the
formal declaration of war was not forthcoming until the following
day. 7 These courts generally allowed recovery and adopted the view
that "war," within the contemplation of the various policies, meant
a condition accepted and recognized by the political authority of
government. 8 In holding that war began as of the date that Congress
declared it, these courts declared themselves bound by the determination of the proper department of government that a war exists. Only
one appellate court reached the conclusion that the parties intended
IS Rogers, "Modern Warfare and Its Effect on Policy Construction,"

1952 INs. L.J. 360.
Vanderbilt v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 248, 184 N.Y.S. 54 (1920); Stankus v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E. (2d) 687 (1942). See also 145 A.L.R.
1464 (1943).
7Pub. Res. 328, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 55 Stat. L. 795 (1941).
8 Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, (D.C. La. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 620; West
v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E. (2d) 475 (1943); Pang v. Sun Life
Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaii 208 (1945); Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Assn., 65 Idaho
408, 145 P. (2d) 227 (1944). See also 19 TuLANE L. REv. 629 (1945); 17 RoCKY MT.
L. REv. 258 (1945); 24 NEB. L. REv. 264 (1945); 47 CoL. L. REv. 742 (1947).
6
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by the use of the word "war" to denote a limitation upon the risk assumed and that the hazard to human life contemplated by the parties
could be fully as great in an undeclared war. 9
C. Termination of Hostilities Prior to Official Declaration. The
question again arose following the armistice after World War II but
before any proclamation by the executive or legislative departments
· of the government announcing the formal termination of the existence of a state of war. The courts permitted recovery where the insurer had failed to make it obvious that the word "war" was intended
to connote a technical meaning and the term was accordingly regarded
as bearing the meaning that common speech imports.10 Where the
death of the insured occurred after the unconditional surrender of
all enemies, a court reasoned that the parties contracted with reference
to war in its real and practical sense in terms of hazard to human
life.11
It is perhaps significant that the Constitution, while giving Congress the power to declare war, does not confer upon it the authority
to conclude peace.12 At any rate, as to when a war terminates, the
courts have uniformly held that the term "war" in the exclusion
clause refers to the end of hostilities as a fact and not as a matter of
formal declaration.13 This holds true notwithstanding broad language
in cases in other areas to the effect that a state of war persists beyond
the cessation of hostilities until officially terminated by a political act.14
D. The Korean Conflict. Recent decisions have found this same
narrow question even more perplexing in light of the fact that the
Korean conB.ict was not the sole responsibility of the United States,
but rather was justified under the United Nations Charter which
vested military powers in the Security Council and made it primarily
9 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, (10th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 260, noted 56
YALE L.J. 746 (1947).
10 Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 233; Nat. Life
and Accident Ins. Co. v. Leverett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 215 S.W. (2d) 939; Mut. Life
Ins. Co. of New York v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E. (2d) 571 (1949); Girdler Corp.
v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., (D.C. Pa. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 713. On a collateral problem
involving interpretation of war exclusion clause see 25 Cm.-:Kmrr L. RBv. 171 (1947); 35
GEo. L.J. 401 (1947); 12 Mo. L. RBv. 212 (1947).
11 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, (10th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 874.
12 56 AM. Jtm., War §13 (1947).
13 Billings, "Of War Clauses," 1952 lNs. L.J. 793 at 800.
14 Bowles v. Ormesher Bros., (D.C. Neb. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 791 (Emergency Price
Control Act); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 68 S.Ct. 1429 (1948) (Alien Enemy
Act). See also Palmer v. Pokorny, 217 Mich. 284, 186 N.W. 505 (1922); Samuels v.
United Seamen's Service, (D.C. Cal. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 461; 168 A.L.R. 173 (1947).
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responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.1 6
Only after the Security Council had denounced the aggression in
Korea as a breach of the international peace and had recommended
that member nations furnish such assistance as might be necessary
did the President of the United States make a public announcement
that our military forces had been authorized to aid the Republic of
Korea.16
Once again the courts were called upon to determine whether a
formal declaration of war by Congress was needed to bring hostilities
such as those in Korea within the war exclusion clause.
1. The Beley case. Perhaps the most celebrated case grappling
with the problem under these novel circumstances was Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co.11 The trial court denied recovery on
the theory that the conflict had been politically recognized by the
proper department of government and hence could be judicially
noticed by the court.18 As the parties had neither indicated an intention to use the term "war" in a technical sense nor had specified
any particular kind or type of war, but had used an all-inclusive term,
the court assumed they contemplated any type of war which involved
hazard to human life. But this decision was overturned on appeal
by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania which held that undeclared
war was not excepted by the policy.19 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ultimately considered the case and affirmed the judgment of
the superior court permitting recovery. In a much discussed opinion
the majority concluded that it was incumbent upon the insurer, as
the party selecting the contractual language, to make it clear that the
term "war" was vested with a broader connotation than its "constitutional" intendment. The court recited a need for a definitive test
of a right to recovery. This was found satisfied by the rule that the
existence of a state of war was a political question of which judicial
15 U.N. CHART.BR, cc. V, VI and VII, 59 Stat. L. 1031 (1945). The Charter was
implemented by the U.N. Participation Act, 59 Stat. L. 619 (1945). H. Rep. No. 1383,
79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1945), contains the interesting language: "Preventative or
enforcement action by these forces upon the order of the Security Council would not be an
act of war but would be international action for the preservation of the peace and for the
purpose of preventing war. Consequently, the provisions of the Charter do not affect the
exclusive power of the Congress to declare war."
16N.Y. TrMEs, June 28, 1950, p. 1:2.
17 373 Pa. 231, 95 A. (2d) 202 (1953). See also Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A. (2d) 221 (1953).
18 County Court of Allegheny County. See 15 LrF.B CAsEs 328 (1951); see also 1953
lNs. L.J. 475 at 478.
19 Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 Pa. Super. 253, 90 A. (2d) 597
(1952). See Goldstein, ''The War Clause in Life Insurance Contracts,''1952 lNs. L.J. 777.
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cognizance could be taken only upon a formal declaration of war by
the political department of the government. The insurer petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but this was
denied, probably for lack of a federal question. 20

2. The Weissman case. The only federal cou~t to pass upon
the effect of the hostilities in Korea on the exclusion clause was the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California,
which rendered the decision in Weissman v. Metropolitan Ins. Co.21
This decision departed from the recent precedents and denied liability on a policy insuring the life of one killed in Korea. It was held
that "war" was possible without an official declaration and that unless
it was indicated in the contract that the term was to be used in a
strict legal sense, the parties had a right to assume that it was to be
given its meaning as commonly understood. That most people in
the United States regarded the struggle in Korea as "war" in stark
reality weighed heavily with the court.
3. The Stanbery case. Another decision holding that the term
"war" is employed in its real or factual sense when found in an
exclusion clause is Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 22 recently handed
down by the Superior Court of New Jersey. The court followed a
dissenting opinion in the Beley case and the holding in the Weissman
case in determining that death of the insured in Korea was within
the intention of the parties as expressed in the exclusion clause. It
was felt that the word "war" when used in a private contract should
not be construed on a public or political basis, or in a legalistic and
technical sense, but rather should be given its ordinary, usual and
realistic meaning.
4. The Meadows case. The latest judicial pronouncement by
a court of last resort construing the term "war" in the context of a
policy of insurance is Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows. 23
In reversing an appellate decision which relied on the Beley case and
held that the parties contemplated that the word "war" be used in
20 346 U.S 820, 74 S.Ct. 34 (1953). See Goldstein, "The War Clause in Life Insurance Contracts," 1953 lNs. L.J. 458 at 478.
21 (D.C. Cal. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 420. The United States Court of Military Appeals
has ruled that the United States was at war in Korea and that court martial offenses should
be treated accordingly. United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.M.C.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953);
United States v. Gann and Sommer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 12, 11 C.M.R. 12 (1953).
22 (N.J. 1953) 98 A. (2d) 134.
23 (Tex. 1953) 261 S.W. (2d) 554, cert. den. (U.S. 1954) 74 S.Ct. 531. See Wheeler,
"The War Clause," 1953 lNs. L.J. 727.
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its legal sense in which only the Congress could declare war, 24 the
Supreme Court of Texas denied recovery under a double indemnity
provision even though the insured did not meet death in Korea. The
opinion stated that the court regarded acts of Congress passed in
acknowledgment of the fact of the conflict in Korea and recognizing
the existence of "war" as tantamount to a de~laration of war and that
the death of the insured would be within the exclusion even if a
technical or legal definition were adopted. However, the court preferred to base its decision on a finding that the term "war" in its
ordinary and accepted meaning is war in fact.

II. Rationale Underlying the Opposing Interpretations
After this sketch of the unsettled state of the law on this question,
it should be profitable to examine more closely the rather cogent arguments supporting each view.

A. The Broad Interpretation of 'War." There is substantial authority tending to support the broad proposition that war may exist
without a formal declaration. Lincoln's conduct at the outset of the
Civil War represented a wide use of unilateral presidential power without congressional sanction.25 The Supreme Court considered the exercise of these powers in the Prize Cases, 26 where it stated that the existence of war was a question of fact and the President was bound to meet
the danger in the shape that it presented itself without waiting for
Congress to give it a name. Later a case arising out of the American
participation in quelling the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 held
that a state of war could exist without a formal declaration by Congress.27 These decisions support the rather compelling conclusion that
war is an existing fact and not a legislative decree and exists despite
the absence of a declaration. 28 In this view, every contention by force
between two or more nations, in external matters, under the authority
of their respective governments, constitutes war. 29
24 Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) 256 S.W. (2d)
674. The court believed that it was without power to declare a state of war existed in
Korea, thereby materially affecting contractual relations as between citizens, when this
determination would necessarily depend on mere hypotheses. This power was said to be
exclusive in the political department of the central government.
25 See CORWIN, THB PRESIDENT: OFFICE .AND PoWERS, 3d rev. ed., 277 (1948).
26 The Amy Warwick, 2 Black (67 U.S.) 635 (1862).
27 Hamilton v. McCiaughry, (8th Cir. 1905) 136 F. 445.
28 Dole v. Merchant's Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465 (1863).
29 56 AM.. JUR., War §4 (1947); Arce v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. Rep. 292, 202 S.W.
951 (1918).
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A declaration of war dignifies or perfects a con:Hict by a general
authorization of all nationals to engage in hostilities against opposing
belligerents, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to the
situation.30 But it is possible for hostilities to exist between nations
which are more confined in nature and extent, and which constitute
"war" although not prefaced by a declaration.31 The "limited war" in
Korea could fit into this category.
Further, it has been held that war may exist without declaration,
but that some form of a public act, proceeding directly from the competent source, should announce to the people at home their new relations and dutjes growing out of the state of war, and should equally
apprise neutral nations of the fact, to enable them to shape their conduct accordingly.32 This operates to legalize hostilities, warranting the
destruction of property and the taking of life on the ground of public
war. Public statements by the President announcing that our troops
had been dispatched to Korea might constitute such an official act. 33
Perhaps the most significant factor underlying the broad interpretation of the term "war" is the consideration of its relation to the risk
assumed by the insurer. It would seem reasonable to infer that the
parties contemplated the hazard to human life incident to "war" when
they used this word to denote a limitation or restriction on the risk
undertaken.34 Since the increased likelihood of death is fully as great
regardless of whether the hostilities are denominated "constitutional
war" or not, the broad interpretation seems more consonant with the
intent of the parties.
The parties are free to contract with reference to "war" and give it
such definition or connotation as they will, as a measure of liability,
and the courts are obligated to construe that term in accordance with
the intention so manifested.35 Where the word "war" is not limited,
restricted or modified by anything appearing in the policy, and refers
to no particular kind or type of war, it applies generally to every situation that ordinary people would regard as war. 36 If nothing in the
contract indicates that the word is used in a vague or indefinite sense,
so 56 AM. Jun., War §4 (1947).
31 Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 21 S.Ct. 358 (1901) (Indian wai:s); Bas
v. Tingy, 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 37 (1800) (reprisals against French).
s2 Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297, 16 S.Ct. 476 (1896). See 56 AM. Jan.,
War §5 (1947).
SSN.Y. T1MEs, June 28, 1950, p. 1:2.
84 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, (10th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 260; Mut. Life
Ins. Co. of New York v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E. (2d) 571 (1949).
s5 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, (10th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 874.
86 Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E. (2d) 687 (1942).
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the provision should be enforced in accordance with its popular meaning.37 An ambiguity must be found before the rule of construction
against the insurer can be invoked.38 If the word "war" is used without
modification, it should be construed as ordinarily understood, a technical construction being inappropriate.
B. The Legal or Constitutional Interpretation of 'War." Courts
are bound by a declaration of the proper department of government
that a war exists.39 The decisions which hold that the term "war" in
the exclusion clause comprehends only declared war generally rely on
the formula that the existence of a state of war is a political question
and that judicial cognizance may be taken thereof only upon a formal
declaration by the political authority.40 There is a wealth of language
in the cases supporting this rule, which seems to rest on the proposition
that by the term "war" is meant not the mere employment of force, but
the existence of the legal condition in which rights may be prosecuted
by force. 41 This "legal" interpretation takes on appeal when it is remembered that forcible measures of redress, i.e., reprisals and embargoes, or even open hostilities with destruction of life and property under
sanction of government, may constitute only provocations to "war," and
may be atoned for and adjusted without "war" ensuing.42
Various juridical consequences may How from the existence of a
state of war, and to determine when these consequences are produced
it is important that the dates of commencement and termination be
ascertained and fixed with certainty.43 The right of recovery under an
insurance policy should not be dependent on the determination of a
question not susceptible of some definite test;44 the war exclusion clause
should be interpreted according to a uniform standard, not a conjectural
hypothesis. 45 War as a condition accepted or recognized by the political
37 Jbid. See Wheeler, ''The War Clause," 1953 I'Ns. L.J. 727.
ss See 45 C.J.S., Insurance §849 (1946).
89 Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Assn., 65 Idaho 408, 145 P. (2d) 227 (1944).
40 67 C.J., War §1 (1934); Bishop v. Jones & Petty, 28 Tex. 294 at 319 (1866):
''There can be no war by its government, of which the court can take judicial knowledge,
until there has been some act or declaration creating or recognizing its existence by that
department of the government clothed with the war-making power." See also Verano v.
De Angelis Coal Co., (D.C. Pa. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 954.
417 MooRE, DrcEST OP lNrERNATIONAL LAw §1100 (1906).
42Bishop v. Jones & Petty, 28 Tex. 294 (1866).
48 Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaii 208 (1945); Hudson, ''The
Duration of the War between the United States and Germany," 39 HARv. L. REv. 1020
(1926).
44 Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A. (2d) 202 (1953),
cert. den. 346 U.S. 820, 14 S.Ct. 34 (1953).
45 Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) 256 S.W. (2d)
674, revd. (Tex. 1953) 261 S.W. (2d) 554, cert. den. (U.S. 1954) 74 S.Ct. 531.
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authority of the central government, by actual declaration of war or
unequivocal act, would serve more suitably as a definite criterion for
the adjudication of rights than war as a conclusion of the judiciary
inferred from the nature of hostilities.46
Further, if "war" is a word which imports various meanings, it
would seem to be incumbent upon the insurer to make clear that it
applies to undeclared war and that the parties intend to invest the term
with a broader meaning than its "constitutional" sense. The contractual language is selected by the insurer and tendered in fixed form as
a highly technical instrument to the prospective policy holder; if its
language is susceptible of more than one construction, it must be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured.47
A "legal" interpretation may also be rationalized in terms of a presumed intent that the exclusionary provision was framed in contemplation of the law of the United States under which only the Congress is
empowered to declare war and only this declaration can place the
nation in a state of war.48

III. Implications for the Insurer
What has happened in Korea can happen elsewhere. If one lays
aside the catastrophic role that atomic or biological weapons could play
in modern warfare,49 and considers only the commitments of the United
States under the United Nations Charter/'° the North Atlantic Treaty5 1
and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program,52 which are now national
policies, it becomes apparent that Congress may never be called upon
again to declare war in its originally accepted "constitutional" significance. These international responsibilities make it possible for the
President to commit our military forces to action on foreign soil on a
scale unknown in some of the congressionally declared wars of the
past.5s
If the parties do not intend their insurance contracts to cover the
risk of death as a result of war in fact, and this is reflected in a lower
premium, the policy language should completely exclude the hazards
46 Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, (D.C. La. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 620.
4729 AM.. JUR., Insurance §166 (1940); 44 C.J.S., Insurance §289 (1945).
48 West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E. (2d) 475 (1943).
See 145 A.L.R. 1464 (1943); 168 A.L.R. 173 (1947).
49 Rogers, "Modem Warfare and Its Effect on Policy Construction," 1952 lNs. L.J. 360.
50 59 Stat. L. 1031 (1945).
5163 Stat. L. 2241 (1949).
52 63 Stat. L. 714 (1949), 22 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1571.
53 See Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231 at 257, 95 A. (2d) 202
(1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 820, 74 S.Ct. 34 (1953).
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of all warfare. Despite a desire for simplicity and clarity in policy
phraseology, those who draft insurance policies must conclude that the
exclusion used thus far is inadequate. While it may be somewhat undesirable to incorporate a compound or legalistic exclusion into policies,
insurers will have to frame an exclusion clause which will encompass
the hazards of war, however classified, and completely except them.154
Some insurers paid all the claims arising out of the Korean conflict,
believing it the "proper thing to do,"155 but most companies have responded, quite naturally, with revisions of their war exclusions, not to
make the policy coverage more restrictive, but to de:6.ne the same coverage in terms of modem warfare and international relations.156 Over :6.fty
companies have added, after the reference to war in the exclusionary
provision, "declared or undeclared," while others have adopted more
complex language in their effort to exclude the war hazard.157

Richard W. Young, S.Ed.

54 Rogers, ''Modem Warfare and Its Effect on Policy Construction," 1952 lNs.
55 N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1953, §3, p. 1.
56 Pollmann, "Commercial Accident Insurance," 1952 INs. L.J. 737 at 744.
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